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Abstract  
This project identifies and evaluates the local and institutional resources that contribute to 
community resilience after a crisis or disaster. Drawing on case studies of localities affected 
by 2011 flooding in South East and Central Queensland and a survey of Queensland 
households, this report considers formal and informal sources of crisis support central to 
community resilience. These resources are examined at the levels of individual and 
household; local associations and community leaders; as well as formal institutional 
resources provided by local, state and federal agencies, with a focus on community 
organisations and state funded community development workers.  Through a household 
survey, in-depth interviews and focus groups, residents’ own evaluations of the importance of 
various levels of assistance are contrasted with the assistance provided formally by various 
institutions and agencies. Existing theories of community resilience will be employed to 
identify the resources available to residents during and after a crisis that have the greatest 
subjective and objective efficacy for community resilience after a disaster. Insights developed 
in this research will be of use to policy makers with clear guidance for the appropriate 
allocation of resources in the future; the most effective communication strategies for ensuring 
that resources are taken up in a timely and useful manner; and improved resources for 
predicting community resilience. 
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Introduction 
This report is based on a number of research projects that focus on the series of natural 
disasters that occurred in Queensland, beginning in December 2010.  The Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry (2012) reported that 33 people died in the 2010/2011 floods and three 
remain missing. More than 78 per cent of the state (an area bigger than France and Germany 
combined) was declared a disaster zone and over 2.5 million people were affected. Some 
29,000 homes and businesses suffered some form of inundation. The Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority has estimated that the economic cost of these floods  to be in excess 
of $5 billion (2011, p. 31). The floods were followed by Tropical Cyclone Yasi in north 
Queensland. By March 2011, 99 per cent of the state of Queensland was disaster-declared 
(Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2011). Additional natural disasters occurred in other 
parts of Australia at this time including floods in NSW and Victoria and bushfires in Western 
Australia. 
It has long been recognised that disasters have consequences for  the collective as well as the 
individual, with local ties, collective identity and sense of community potentially 
strengthened or undermined by the shared experience of trauma (Fritz and Williams, 1957; 
Erikson, 1976; Norris et al., 1994; Johnes, 2000; Lerry and Lindell, 2003). Interest has been 
growing in the way that ‘community’, and its constitutive features of local networks, 
associations and citizen involvement, function as a resource to help residents better prepare 
for and recover from such events (Airriess et al, 2008; Chamlee-Wright and Stour, 2011; 
Frankenberg et al., 2012). In academic parlance, this capacity for disaster readiness and 
response is understood as ‘community resilience’, a term that has now gained currency 
among policymakers wanting individuals and communities to become ‘more self-reliant and 
prepared to take responsibility for the risks they live with’ (Council of Australian 
Governments, 2009: 10).  
Disaster resilience, and particularly community resilience, is an idea that has gained 
significant momentum in the last decade as a way for policy makers and practitioners to 
identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of target populations experiencing disasters.   The 
focus in Australia, and Queensland, has been on natural disasters such as cyclones, floods and 
bushfires, however the concept may also have applicability for human induced disasters, such 
as terrorist attacks.  Resilience as a social concept has its roots in biological and ecosystems 
scholarship, where resilience is seen as the ability of individual organisms and ecosystems to 
either ‘bounce back’ to their original form follow a major disruption or to successfully adapt 
to new conditions following a disruption. 
This ecological allegory has been transferred into the social realm as researchers have 
investigated ways of measuring and explaining the necessary qualities that individuals and 
communities require to either recover or adapt successfully in the wake of the loss and 
disruption of disaster.  The social form of resilience is still in its infancy and it faces 
significant challenges, not the least of which is identifying the nature of community in early 
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21st century society.   Australia is an affluent nation with strong institutions and relatively 
high levels of trust in those institutions.  At the same time, we are less bound by geographical 
place; our social and material support come from a wide variety of sources such as 
geographically disparate networks of family, friends and associates.   
For this reason the idea of community resilience as a framework for disaster policy has been 
subject to criticism for its assumption that a geographical space corresponds with 
‘community’ and that resilience is determined by the capacity of its members to generate 
shared resources and collectively mobilise them as needed (Kirschenbaum, 2004). These 
criticisms are seen as especially pertinent to urban contexts and echo well-established debates 
about the extent to which idealised communal bonds have been rendered meaningless for a 
more mobile, individualistic and outwardly-connected urban population. 
However, community of place is not just an obsolete historical construct - people maintain 
and actively nurture local networks for instrumental and aesthetic reasons in both rural and 
urban settings.  The onset of a disaster, such as the widespread floods that inundated much of 
southern Queensland during  December 2010 and January 2011, puts  three levels of potential 
support to the test: institutional, networked and local.  The purpose of this study was to 
interrogate the ways in which these various levels of support act to foster resilience to the 
effects of disaster across a range of rural and urban settings.  
It was in this context that project addressed the following four aims: 
1) To identify individual households’ disaster preparedness and assess the influence of 
the behaviour of fellow community members and community organisation on 
household resilience  
2) To assess the allocation and effectiveness of formal and informal, local and extra-
local resources across communities affected by a natural disaster and their 
relationship to community resilience. 
3) To identify the most effective communication strategies for resource uptake during 
and immediately following a disaster and the impact of such strategies on community 
resilience  
4) To examine the roles, responsibilities and efficacy of the newly funded state 
community development officers in building capacity for future resilience from 
subsequent disasters. 
In the following three sections of this report, we will address these issues, using first a 
statistical overview of Queensland using data and findings from the ‘Living in Queensland’ 
survey, and then reports from qualitative case studies carried out in rural Queensland and in 
urban settings in Brisbane.  
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 Overview of Queensland 
In this first section we provide an overview of resilience measures in Queensland using the 
Living in Queensland survey.  The Living in Queensland research was designed to identify 
how Queenslanders and their communities might contribute to preparedness, response and 
recovery and as a corollary of this, resilience.   Wave five of the Living in Queensland 
survey, funded by QCSSI, statistically identifies and examines if, and how, after the summer 
of 2010/11, Queenslanders have changed their individual behaviours to plan for and recover 
from natural disasters. In addition, it gauged public perceptions of the role of government 
agencies in disaster preparedness and response. Lastly,   included new measures of individual 
resilience amongst Queenslanders as well as  perceptions of community resilience.      
 In the literature on social process and disaster consequences, there are mixed results on the 
latent consequences of natural disasters on individuals as well as communities. Some scholars 
point to community breakdown post disaster. Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925) note that 
sudden environmental change can disrupt communities by causing a breakdown in 
community regulation or social control. This in turn may cause further community problems 
such as crime and disorder and may increase the potential for victimisation especially for 
vulnerable populations.  Norris et al (2008) find in some communities, after a natural disaster, 
social networks and social ties are disrupted. This may be due to an influx of outsiders that 
come to aid the community in times of recovery, or a sudden flight of residents from disaster 
affected homes. Enduring social networks are an important aspect of resilience for 
communities as their benefits provide security and safety for residents.    
Though much of the existing literature around community resilience has focused on cohesion 
and social ties,   little is known about how perceptions and behaviours change over time, 
particularly after a disaster has occurred. In Queensland, rebuilding after the 2010/2011 
disasters was led by   community leaders yet we do not understand how these leaders were 
most helpful or how they emerge as leaders in their community. The focus of the Living in 
Queensland study is to better understand how Queenslanders perceive their community, 
particularly in how those perceptions may have changed in the 18 months after the summer of 
2011, what they have learned about their community, and how they have coped after severe 
weather events that have affected Queensland in recent years. 
Method 
The Living in Queensland Survey is a longitudinal study initially designed to measure life 
satisfaction, health and wellbeing amongst Queensland residents. The more recent waves of 
the survey were administered to understand residents’ perceptions of risk and collective 
efficacy both before and after the 2010/2011 disasters, seeking to benchmark attitudes on 
preparatory and response behaviors to natural emergencies. Comprising eight modules with 
an additional module in Waves four and five, the Living in Queensland Survey sought to 
measure individual and community resilience across Queensland.  
Waves one and two of the Survey sought to provide a statistical measurement of health, 
wellbeing and social inequality with Wave one focusing on employment and satisfaction and 
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Wave two adding a Health module. A disaster preparedness module was added to Wave three 
to garner an understanding of people’s experiences with natural disasters, its effect on them, 
and how people prepare for and respond to natural disaster events. Wave four served as a 
follow up survey six months after the Queensland Floods and Cyclone Yasi that occurred in 
January 2011, seeking to determine changes to respondents’ preparedness and response 
behaviours.   
The most recent wave of the Living in Queensland Survey (Wave five – the focus of this 
report) sought to understand respondents’ experience with and exposure to natural disasters 
and their preparedness behaviour, with questions to measure their perceptions of risk both 
immediately after a natural disaster and in the potential for a natural disaster. The Survey 
measured respondents’ collective action and social ties with others in their community and 
their perceptions of tiers of government and their confidence in them, the effectiveness of 
these institutions, and whether respondents believe government should take responsibility for 
protecting individuals from disaster in providing a response and contributing to the recovery 
from a natural disaster. The final sections of the survey measure individual and collective 
resilience, through assessments of economic wellbeing, collective efficacy, life satisfaction 
and access to resources.  
Waves three to five of the Living in Queensland Survey were conducted over a three year 
period from 2010 to 2012 via mail out surveys and Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviewing (CATI) of a representative sample of Queensland residents aged 18 years and 
over from six regions within the state. A total of 2360 Queenslanders participated in Wave 
three of the Survey, which was conducted in 2010 prior to the 2010/2011 disasters. 1403 
people participated in Wave 4 of the Survey, and 1335 participated in Wave 5 of the Survey, 
which were six and eighteen month follow up surveys disseminated after the floods. The 
follow up surveys were conducted to measure perceptions of risk and preparedness behaviour 
for natural disasters, as well as the role of community and government when preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from a natural disaster.  
The main modules of interest in the final wave of the Survey were those that measured 
volunteerism, institutional confidence, community resilience and individual resilience in the 
aftermath of the 2010/2011 disasters and the factors that contributed to the recovery effort. 
Descriptions of these factors are below:  
 
Experience 
Measuring previous experience with natural disasters helped understand the proportion of 
respondents who were familiar with the resources and actions required in the aftermath of a 
disaster. We were particularly interested to examine differences in responses of risk and 
confidence in government based on previous experience.  
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Volunteerism 
We were interested in whether respondents actively participated in community based 
recovery efforts in the aftermath of the 2010/2011 floods as a measure of collective action 
and social cohesion.  
Institutional Confidence 
Institutional confidence encompassed respondents’ levels of trust, respect and confidence in 
all tiers of government and served as a comparative measure to gauging whether confidence 
in government had increased, decreased or remained stable before and after the Summer of 
Disasters.   
Community Resilience  
Collective Efficacy 
Measuring neighbourhood cohesion, collective action, trust, safety, and whether 
respondents shared the same values as others in their community was an important gauge 
of collective efficacy.  
Leadership  
Understanding whether there was a leadership presence within the community that 
respondents were aware of and trusted to deliver accurate and timely information and 
provide support to make a difference within the community during crises was important 
to understanding the level of independence within a community and whether there was a 
strong reliance on government intervention or if the community had the capacity to act 
collectively during crises.  
Individual Resilience  
Quality of Life  
Measuring respondents’ life satisfaction and quality of life in this final Wave of the 
Living in Queensland Survey acted as a comparative variable to gauge whether people’s 
wellbeing had changed over time and other factors that may have affected this.  
Access to Resources  
Understanding whether people had access to resources and what type of resources people 
accessed in the aftermath of the Summer of Disasters helped to measure whether these 
were a prominent feature of the recovery process.  
Results 
Disaster Experience 
Although more than 90% of the state of Queensland was affected in one way or another by 
the disasters of 2010/2011 (Arnison, Gotterson & Apelt, 2011), when our survey was 
conducted in 2012, approximately 54% of survey respondents (n = 708) indicated that they 
had been present during a natural disaster in the past. Of these respondents, the majority 
(71%; n = 444) were affected in some way by the 2010/2011 disasters or additional severe 
weather patterns since February of 2011 (for example, rural flooding in the summer of 2012). 
Furthermore, 90% of those respondents who had been present during a natural disaster 
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indicated that their most recent experience of a natural disaster occurred in the community  
where they are currently living.  
Disaster Relief 
The damage from floodwaters to the South-East Queensland area alone, particularly in the 
cities of Brisbane and Ipswich, involved a massive volunteer effort for recovery. Property 
damage, loss of wages and other damage due to the flood required financial support. Though 
affected by flooding and severe weather in 2010/2011, 70% of these respondents (n = 948) 
did not access any support in the recovery effort. Of those respondents who did access 
support, the most common were from Centrelink (12% of all respondents) and support from 
an insurance agency (7% of all respondents). Overall, we find that very few respondents 
claimed assistance from local resources such as the Department of Communities (2%), 
Queensland Health (1%), charitable organisations (such as Red Cross, Lifeline, or Micah 
Projects; ~3%) or other local organisations.  The majority of respondents who were affected 
by the disaster in 2011 did not claim relief from the Prime Ministers’ disaster relief fund 
(89%) 
	  
Following the flood damage to SEQ in January 2011, recovery efforts included fundraisers as 
well as organised volunteering for post disaster clean up. Those respondents who did 
participate in the post disaster recovery effort (33% of respondents) did so as largely as 
unregistered volunteers in the ‘Mud Army’ (8%, versus 2% who were registered volunteers), 
a locally organised event to distribute volunteers across the Brisbane area as a response to the 
damage caused by flooding.   Arnison, Gotterson and Apelt (2011) report that there were 
approximately 25,000 registered mud army volunteers. We find that many more Queensland 
residents are likely to have participated informally the clean-up effort immediately following 
the  floods. 
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Community Resilience and Emerging Leadership 
In the aftermath of a serious weather event, the process to restore a community back to 
functioning capacity involves an effective disaster management strategy. These strategies are 
crucial to boosting community resilience and capacity building (Härtel & Latemore, 2011) 
and are often conducted by members of the community who adopt a representative leadership 
role during the absence of government bodies in the immediate aftermath of an event 
(Skocpol, Ganz & Munson, 2000).  Many such leaders have pre-existing organisational skills 
that can be effectively adapted and used in a post-disaster context (Patterson, Weil & Patel, 
2010).   
When asked to indicate who the most effective community leaders were in their community 
post disaster, survey respondents overwhelmingly nominated leadership from local 
governments and other institutional actors such as council members and police. Respondents 
also reported effective leadership from regular citizens, be they victims of the disaster or not.  
Interestingly, 24% of respondents indicated that effective leadership came from “other” 
sources about which they were not asked. This indicates that there is still more to learn about 
who effective leaders are in communities. Regardless of whom community leaders were, 
most respondents (83%) indicated that they saw this individual as a community leader prior 
to the disaster. 
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Respondents indicate that where emerging leaders make the biggest impact is in the 
communication of vital informal in times of disaster (24% of respondents). However, 
respondents also indicated that leaders made positive impacts by leading organised recovery 
efforts, and providing information about post disaster assistance. 
	  
These results suggest that in the wake of natural disasters, leaders play an important role in 
the recovery effort. Seeing directly the response, support and leadership in the wake of the 
disaster increases citizen awareness of leadership capacity, particularly for political leaders, 
within the community and therefore increases the perception of positive leadership. The 
importance of these political leaders in informing the community and leading the response 
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may have further implications for communities’ ability to self-organise and promote 
leadership from within.  
Changes Over time 
Responses to life satisfaction and social cohesion survey items were tracked over time. In 
2010, social cohesion and life satisfaction survey items provided a baseline measure for 
Queensland attitudes towards their own life circumstances as well as attitudes towards the 
community.  These items were assessed again with the same respondents 6 months after the 
2011 disaster and again 18 months after the disaster in Queensland.  
We find that respondents’ perceptions of social cohesion have decreased in the 18 month 
period following the 2010/2011 disaster period. Though this decrease is small, it may reflect 
the anticipated flux of residents in and out of flood affected communities after the disaster. 
However, decreased perceptions of social cohesion may indicate that some individuals and 
communities may not be as ready to prepare and respond to a future disaster. In contrast, 
scores on the life satisfaction scale have significantly increased over the same time period for 
respondents, indicating that the affect associated with the disaster has not adversely affected 
life satisfaction among Queenslanders as a direct result of the floods. These results highlight 
the difficulty in measuring and understanding resilience in the post disaster context. While 
social cohesion, one of the most salient and common measures of resilience, suggests that the 
capacity for community resilience has decreased; other indicators show that other potential 
sources of resilience are not experiencing the same negative trend.  These results also indicate 
that further research is necessary in order to understanding why these changes are occurring 
overtime. For example, what elements of the disaster response and recovery period are 
responsible for the downtrend in social cohesion and uptrend in satisfaction? Understanding 
the antecedents for these changes will uncover aspects of disaster management policy and 
practice that are potentially harmful as well as a potential opportunity for building resilience 
in communities and individuals. 
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Conclusion	  
The natural disasters of 2010 and 2011 and the ways in which people responded to the 
disaster have implications for emergency management strategies. The impact of community 
leaders in assisting the response and recovery process highlights an area of further inquiry 
into the identification of effective leaders in natural disaster contexts. Natural disaster 
resources available to citizens in their preparatory, response and recovery actions are 
essential to their resilience and it is crucial to ensure accessibility to such resources at all 
stages of the disaster management process.  
The next two sections of the report focus on case studies of three locations, one rural and two 
urban to use the experiences of various stakeholders to provide a number of lessons about the 
ways that communities and local and institutional players provide support during and after a 
disaster.
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The Rural 
Introduction 
Academic literature on community cohesion, social capital,  disaster resilience and other 
related concepts often uses rural contexts in which to develop and test explanations of these 
phenomena.  The reason for this is that rural settings are more likely to behave in the ways 
we would expect of ‘communities’ in the popular imagination.  Rural locations, particularly 
in  Australia, are likely to be geographically isolated from other communities and have small 
populations with dense webs of social interaction, dependence and affect.  A disaster of the 
types experienced in 2010/2011 in Queensland is likely to affect an entire community and so 
there will be a strong sense of common purpose, the essential feature in any definition of 
‘community’.   The rural case study for this report was carried out in Theodore, a small town 
(population 452) 250 km west of Bundaberg in central Queensland.  Based on Theodore’s 
small size and remoteness, it might be expected to demonstrate a range of qualities that are 
typically associated with rural communities and it is in that context that Theodore was 
selected as a case study to make qualitative comparisons with urban locations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	  1:	  	  Theodore	  in	  flood,	  January	  2011	  
 
The flood 
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Water is the reason Theodore was established, and being on a flood plain, Theodore has 
experienced a number of floods  during its history. The town’s  Folk Museum contains 
photographs of floods in and around the town in 1928, 1932, 1954 and 1956. However, a 
graph demonstrating the annual rainfall from 1928 – 1993 indicates minor to major flooding 
probably occurred in 1948, 1972, 1974 and 1983 as well (Johnson 1994, p. 26). The graph 
also demonstrates that many years the region had lower than average rainfall and indeed, in 
the 1960s and 1990s, significant drought was experienced in the region. 
This background to the history of Theodore is important to understanding the community 
resilience that is evident when the people of the area are faced with adversity.  Although this 
case study is mostly concerned with exploring issues related to social capital and resilience, 
understanding the origins of Theodore helps to put into context the economic and 
environmental capitals against which the social capital exists. It is helpful, for example, to 
understand that from its very beginnings, only those who had a ready supply of money were 
allowed to take up the farming blocks and that these blocks had perpetual leasehold and no 
land tax, unlike many soldier settler schemes that were grounded in poverty from their very 
beginnings. This is not to say that there is an abundance of economic capital within the 
region, or that economic hardship is not experienced by some, perhaps all, at various points 
in time. However, the continuing domination of individual family-farms in the region does 
indicate there is likely to be a substantial economic base. It is also helpful to understand the 
regular flooding of the area replenishes alluvial soils and allows the land to be intensively 
cultivated; that these events actually sustain the economic capital of the region. However, the 
reduced diversity of crops currently being grown may be increasing the vulnerability within 
Theodore’s environmental capital (Wilson 2012), and this can have significant implications 
for future economic and social capital within the region. 
The study 
Interviews were conducted between 23 July and 2 August, 2012 .  The aim of the interviews 
was to explore the effectiveness and efficiency of services provided to Theodore immediately 
after the 2010/11 flood events and in the 18 months afterwards, and to explore the leadership 
that was shown by people during this time. All interviewees were intimately involved in 
providing services or leadership at various times in this period and included: 
• The mayor of the Banana Shire at the time of the flood until April 2012; 
• The Local Government member  who located himself in Theodore for 6 weeks during 
the floods and played a pivotal role in coordinating services during the response and 
early recovery periods; 
• A health district worker with a background in nursing and who had lived and worked 
in the area for over 20 years who was part of the local coordination team; 
• A local business woman who is involved in the local Chamber of Commerce; 
• The president of the local branch of Cotton Australia at the time of the events; 
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• A community development officer located in the Shire 
• An economic and social development provider who has had many years of 
community development experience, including disaster response and recovery, and 
who is a business owner in Biloela, but has extensive connection with Theodore; 
• The manager of a non-government service provider of counselling services to 
Theodore 
• A local counsellor associated with a non-government service provider. 
Results 
Although the experiences of each of the participants were quite different, a number of 
common themes emerged from the analysis of the interviews, including: 
1) Understanding the rural context of the events 
2) The importance of prior relationships 
3) The importance of local coordination 
4) Meeting needs of the local community 
5) Complications related to government funding 
6) Stepping up to leadership roles during a crisis. 
The rural context 
The small size of Theodore and the definite boundaries of human settlement in a rural setting 
allows for a density of networked interaction and common familiarity which provides a 
strong basis for community.  However, as described in the introduction, it is common purpose 
rather than simply familiarity which defines community and the research identified a strong 
sense of common purpose and identity based on the stoic, self-sufficient characteristics of 
rural people, although it was acknowledged this could also have negative consequences when 
that stoicism translates into a failure to acknowledge the need for services and so failing to 
access them.  
We had this enormous downpour of eight inches in one night or something and the water 
backed off the street and went back through the shop again. That business owner was 
struggling. That was very difficult for her and I know she was teetering but the 
community, bless them, knew that she was struggling and really went out of their way to 
support her. Whether you wanted another cup of coffee or not, or a loaf of bread or 
whatever, you went and bought it (Meredith) 
The rural context illustrated in these comments demonstrates a peculiarity associated with 
how floods have been interpreted and how rural people respond to services on offer. First, it 
is evident financial services are paramount in rural communities, although not all residents 
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are able or willing to access financial assistance either because they are not aware of these 
services or because they fear there is a stigma associated with such access.  
The second point to note is that the stoic and self-sufficient values subscribed to by many 
living in this rural area can prohibit them from accepting they may need to access counselling 
services to help deal with the financial and emotional stressors that they experience.  
The importance of prior relationships 
The second theme emerges out of the first in that it emphasises the importance of service 
providers having a prior relationship with the community. Rural communities tend to be 
suspicious of ‘outsiders’ (Collins et al 2009) and value relationships with others within their 
own communities (Maybery et al 2009). However, small rural communities do not have 
extensive services and in situations involving large scale physical and emotional damage, 
external services are a necessity. This is recognised within Theodore. What becomes clear in 
this theme is that those services that had prior connections to the community or who used 
local people as employees or brokers, tended to be more readily accepted by the community. 
Sometimes I was probably the only local person in the room, so they’d identify a point, 
or an issue, or someone that had identified that they’d had a problem and quite often I 
was able to just give some local knowledge to that, which made for – you fast tracked the 
fixing of it usually. Or someone could come up with an idea and I could say, ‘Oh yes, 
that’ll work’, or I’d say, ‘No, I don’t think you’ll get that to work in this community’. So 
we were able to – it was just that local linkage, I think, that worked really well 
(Meredith). 
Importance of local coordination 
During both the response and recovery phases a number of services came to Theodore to help 
with the clean-up or to provide more long-term support to residences. Response teams came 
from Red Cross, Lifeline, the Armed Forces, CentreLink, Department of Primary Industries, 
Anglicare, State Emergency Services, Queensland Rail workers and other government and 
non-government agencies. In addition, large numbers of donations were coming into the 
community even before the flood waters had subsided. Such a large influx of people arriving 
amidst the chaos of residents trying to clean up their homes and businesses required 
significant coordination. This was provided by a small group of local people brought together 
by the Local Government member (who had family ties to the area as far back as 1863) and 
consisted of a local doctor who had worked in the community for some 25 years, a Theodore 
District Health Council worker who was also a long term resident of the community, and a 
cotton grower whose family had been in the region for a number of generations. While the 
nature of this group and the leadership role they played will be explored in more detail in a 
later theme, this local group provided a pivotal point for the response and recovery efforts. In 
a small community with dense networks there is the capacity to provide and anticipate for 
people’s needs that might not be available in circumstances where less organic support was 
the only type available:  
So that it was this person [local health staff member whose house was also flooded] here 
is out working who’s cleaning their house? So let’s get that house done. Let’s go and 
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clean that house first. Let’s make sure that when they go home from their coordination, 
that they can actually get into a bed with clean sheets. When we support those people 
who are supporting, the support becomes stronger (Trevor). 
Waste and inefficiency through lack of coordination 
 
It is ironic that a natural disaster can bring out the best in people wanting to help, but that 
such help can also be a hindrance to the work that needs to be done. In Theodore, it is evident 
many of the agencies did not provide prior notice of their arrival which would have been 
helpful in being able to better utilise these services immediately.  
In a lot of cases, these people just turned up and we were trying to do our best and 
suddenly, ah, this mob’s here or that mob’s there or the Salvo’s here. You’ll think, ‘Oh 
God, what do we do with them? Who ordered them?’ So yeah, that was a little bit – yeah 
not much local communication on that so, one of the things I battled with was what are 
these people doing here? Why are they here? Can we handle them?... So yeah there was a 
bit of an issue with the coordination and advice to me on the ground, so that I knew these 
people were coming and where I could house them when they got here… But they just all 
came with no coordination as such and me having no knowledge of what services they 
were providing to whom (Bill). 
But we had to try and coordinate how we did that, how we sent them out and even the 
army psychologists – as I said we ended up with seven of them, but no one was well lined 
up for them. So we had to think, ‘Well we’ve got these seven people for a week, how are 
we going to utilise them?’ So what we did, all the staff from the doctor’s surgery and 
from the aged care hostel and centre, they were still on full pay even though they didn’t 
really have any work to do, so we utilised a lot of those staff to be our community liaison 
people, I guess. So we’d put a local person with the psychologist or the social worker, 
whoever we had and send them off (Meredith). 
Meeting needs of the local community 
Although natural disasters cause significant physical damage to the landscape and 
communities who live within that landscape, the damage sustained by individuals and 
communities goes much deeper. This theme draws out the needs of the Theodore community 
that needed to be met during the response and recovery phases: infrastructure and material 
needs; economic needs; emotional needs; and educational needs. It also highlights whose 
needs were perhaps not being met within the community and thus identifies gaps in services. 
Throughout the clean-up, a daily community barbeque was provided at the makeshift 
headquarters and this not only provided food for residents and workers, but provided a space 
for assessment of residents. This informal way of residents picking up on the needs of other 
residents and seeking out appropriate help is a strong feature of this theme and demonstrates 
the deep and extensive social networks that exist within the community.  
We were advertising [the barbecues] and they were a great place for me especially to 
work with because of the services that came in, we didn’t have a referral process of 
anything formal set up. So to identify people quite often at those barbeques I’d just look 
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around and if I saw someone not mingling or hanging off by themselves I’d either go and 
speak to them or I’d take someone with me and we’d just go and strike up a conversation. 
I’ve got a nursing background, so we were pretty quick to realise which people were just 
tired and buggered and wanted to be by themselves, or people that were really in need of 
some help and needed someone to talk to. That’s how we did a lot of the identification 
and we made that really, really clear at every meeting and at every function that if 
anybody was worried about someone else and didn’t know what to do, to at least come 
and speak to myself about the person and we would then source services or whoever we 
could grab at the time and go to that person (Meredith). 
This issue of who wins and who loses economically from disasters is one that needs to be 
addressed within a broader policy area because there are very real financial viability 
implications for small rural communities who do not have many businesses and whose 
businesses may not have sufficient reserves to navigate their way through the financial 
disturbance. In Theodore, for example, the electrical goods store went out of business within 
18 months of the floods because most houses had been supplied with new electrical goods 
through insurance and donations schemes. In comparison, the bakery was able to survive 
through the support of local people buying bread and coffee, whether they needed it or not 
(see first theme). 
The clean up certainly happened much quicker than they had anticipated, which I’m not 
sure is a good or a bad thing, because it sort of meant that people were in shock and they 
weren’t given time to assess what they wanted to keep, what they wanted to throw out 
themselves. Someone just came in and had a big clean out for them and I think … that’s 
causing a bit of grief even now still, because people have realised that that got thrown out 
and it probably could have been saved, but at the time they didn’t make that decision and 
for some they couldn’t make that decision (Meredith).  
The need to have emotional support through counselling and other activities such as 
community events was raised by a number of participants, although it was also recognised 
that the funding that provided these services was due to run out in June 2013 and there was 
concern about what may happen after that time when services would be withdrawn. 
 When all the physical fixing uping [sic] is done and all that’s left is the financial 
situation, the emotional stuff that afterwards too, where you realise, like I remember 
sitting there afterwards going I’m just not the person I used to be, I don’t feel the same 
way in energy, in tolerance, in any of that sort of stuff. You notice that after a while 
because you think I should go back – you think I should be back to normal by now, maybe 
I’m changed forever. Those sorts of parts are actually a lot trickier and that’s probably 
the times where you look for the Lifelines and the Anglicares and all that sort of stuff. 
When you’re clearer about what the actual personal problem is. It’s hard too because I 
know 12 months later it’s really hard – you know that that’s when a lot of people are 
needing to access the services. But trying to advertise or drum up any sort of interest in 
the F word after that long afterwards, people are just sick of it. They are sick of talking 
about it (Erin). 
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Complications related to government funding 
The constraints in services provision were perceived in both the response and recovery 
phases, whereas the duplication of services was perceived primarily in relation to the 
recovery phase, although it should be noted that not all participants perceived any 
duplication. Indeed, as an earlier theme indicated, considerable efforts were made locally to 
coordinate services to minimise duplication or overlapping of services within the community. 
The constraints in provision primarily related to established services at the time of the flood 
being able to ‘stretch’ their funding guidelines to enable them to provide immediate support 
to the community.  
Furthermore, some of the government regulations associated with recovery counselling 
schemes, in particular, have created their own constraints and have likely contributed to the 
implementation of services that may not have been entirely warranted.  
But the government given them so many clients that they’ve got to see to match that 
money and the outputs. So it was; it’s a real stress factor; trying to – they want to help 
these people but, you know like to get four, five, six clients a day every day is a big thing 
to do (Lorna). 
It should be noted none of the participants denied the necessity of significant emotional 
support being provided to the residents of Theodore after the flood events, or that long-term 
support would be needed as the community slowly recovered and rebuilt. However, how such 
support was implemented as a direct result of some government guidelines associated with 
the financial support for these services was certainly questioned by a number of participants. 
 
Stepping up to leadership roles during a crisis.  
A comment that is made quite frequently in casual conversation in Theodore is, ‘Theodore 
has a lot of leaders’. While some of these were people who were expected to take up a more 
prominent role because of their current paid or voluntary work, a number of others also 
stepped up. Some of these leaders were perhaps not prepared for the emotional, mental and 
physical strain such an intense role can involve during a crisis. It was often people who were 
playing a support role in the community who were in need of support themselves, but whose 
needs may not have been met as well as they could have been. 
I think those who rose to the occasion in leadership roles immediately were those that we 
would have expected to do that. I think they played their role very well… I often thought 
who was there to prop them up and it was the wives obviously (Brenda) 
Although, as Brenda’s comments suggest many of the leadership roles were undertaken by 
men, many were also picked up by women. As such, it is not gender that seems to have been 
a defining feature of the leadership shown in Theodore. Rather, characteristics that 
contributed to the leadership related to being known and trusted in the community, a track 
record of stepping up, and social and political connections. 
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Although, as Brenda’s comments suggest many of the leadership roles were undertaken by 
men, many were also picked up by women. As such, it is not gender that seems to have been 
a defining feature of the leadership shown in Theodore. Rather, characteristics that 
contributed to the leadership related to being known and trusted in the community, a track 
record of stepping up, and social and political connections. 
I think with the expected things – like I think there’s an attitude and expectation about 
CC and about his role and about his history with the community… He’s been validated 
within the community (Jane). 
But I guess at the same time too being a woman in agriculture and being a mother of a 
young child, I play a different role to what those 50 year old men do… So while they 
were busy out on diggers fixing things and doing all that physical stuff, us women were 
left in the house and I was looking after my daughter, but we were sort of left there just 
thinking that the most we could do was have a hot cooked meal at night. I really hated 
that and I felt that if I could – it was my way to help out [taking on leadership role]… I 
took on that because that was where I could – felt I could be most useful (Erin). 
The intensity of the role and the number of people who stepped up to a leadership role within 
the community suggests that some may not have been as well prepared for the role at the 
time. As such, a number of aspects were identified that are needed to develop leadership so 
they are better prepared to take on roles in a crisis. 
Yes, I think they could be, even just within personal development, communication type 
development, understanding of why people are angry, why people are sad. I guess we’ve 
had a lot of that since the flood, which has been really good. I guess if we’re flooded 
again tomorrow we would do things a whole lot better (Meredith). 
It appears a number of people within Theodore responded to the flood by taking on additional 
roles and mobilised their leadership potential. Their ability to be able to do this probably rests 
with a long and strong commitment to voluntary activities within the town, where many have 
worked in local committees together prior to the floods and  had established firm 
relationships and networks as well as trust in the abilities of others. While the leadership roles 
they took on meant they became more visible within the community, their success in these 
roles depended on the relationships they had formed previously. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the six themes that emerged in this case study to a large extent support Norris 
et al’s (2007) model of community resilience as a set of networked adaptive capacities (figure 
1). They highlight the importance of information and communication, of community 
competence, of social capital and of economic development as the community of Theodore 
learned to deal with the floods of 2010/2011 over time. Some aspects were strengthened as a 
result of the floods, for example, it is likely community competence and social capital have 
increased as the community has mobilised and become engaged in a number of community 
activities and reflected on the community as a whole as it perhaps did not do prior to the 
floods. The information and communication channels within the community have also likely 
been reinforced and the community have explored new ways of communicating with each 
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other through mobile phone and social media, an aspect that while not drawn out in the 
themes, was evident during the floods and which was mentioned by a number of participants. 
Economic development, however, is the one aspect of the model as it applies to Theodore 
that may not have benefited from the floods, although some people may have gained 
personally as a result of renovations to their houses and the replacement of household goods. 
Overall, the floods had a devastating impact on the rural properties and thus the income of 
farming families who together form the life-blood of the economy in Theodore. The floods 
also affected directly and indirectly on the viability of businesses within the township. These 
businesses are a vital part of the community as they provide everyday services to the people 
of the town and surrounding area, services that are not available otherwise (the nearest 
township to Theodore is 50km away).  
This case study of Theodore and the way this community responded to the floods of 
2010/2011 has demonstrated there were a number of factors that contributed to the township 
being able to respond and recover in a positive manner. Not everything worked perfectly, but 
the level of prior social capital within the town and surrounding district, forged over many 
years of facing a range of adverse events and learning how to work together to make the most 
of opportunities for the town, meant the residents of the area were able to pull together 
quickly and effectively when faced with the level of damage and destruction left behind by 
the floods. To a large extent they controlled the services that were deployed during the crisis 
and played a major role in directing services during the recovery phase and thus displayed a 
significant level of collective efficacy. These features are evident in the themes that emerged 
from this case study: understanding the rural context of events; importance of prior 
relationships; importance of local coordination; meeting needs of the community; 
complications related to government funding and services; stepping up to leadership roles 
during a crisis. These features also support the model of community resilience as a set of 
networked adaptive capacities put forward by Norris et al (2007). This report has explored 
this model and considered how the themes derived from the case study align with this model, 
suggesting on the whole this model works quite well in explaining why the people of 
Theodore have dealt with this particular crisis quite well. By no means have all issues been 
resolved in Theodore, and there will continue to be concern regarding the long term effects of 
the floods, particular concerning the financial impact of the events which are likely to have 
implications for the mental and emotional health of individuals and families. However, as a 
community, there are clearly signs the community has navigated its way through the last two 
years in a way that has probably resulted in a stronger community and one that is better 
prepared to face future adversities.
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The Urban  
Introduction 
In many respects, the urban environment poses a different set of challenges to that of the 
rural.  As we explained above, rural environments have distinct boundaries, a more readily 
identifiable membership, more grounds for common purpose and often more dense place-
based webs of social connection than cities.  In urban environments the boundaries of 
‘suburb’ or ‘neighbourhood’ are drawn for instrumental or bureaucratic purposes and may or 
may not reflect the boundaries of an actual community.  Geographical proximity and the 
assumption of community can mask the fact that in urban environments, people's networks 
are formed for social, economic, educational and cultural and recreational purposes and often 
do not coincide with the geographical environs of one’s suburb.  If we add to that the high 
day to day and residential mobility of Australian urban dwellers, the physical location of 
one’s dwelling becomes a much less reliable indicator and source of potential social support 
than in it might in a rural or regional location.   
Disasters, such as those that occurred in South East Queensland provide an opportunity to 
investigate the ways that people in cities organise for disaster and how they support each 
other, as well as the relative importance of institutional actors in disaster mitigation.  The 
ways in which disaster resilience is understood is likely to both similarities and differences 
rural communities as a result of these differences in context.  
In this section of the report we use qualitative case studies, conducted in Fairfield in Brisbane 
and North Booval in Ipswich, two quite different locations, to investigate the nature of 
recovery and resilience in the urban setting.  Tierney (2007: 510) argues that, rather than 
fundamentally reshaping the existing social order, natural disasters function as ‘breaching 
events’ which reveal the structure of social order more clearly than do peaceful times when 
those structures are more implicit and assumed. 
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Fairfield 
In June 2012, the State Library of Queensland opened its Floodlines exhibition that aimed to 
provide a social history of the state’s ‘Summer of Sorrow’ (O’Brien & Howells, 2011). 
Celebration of community capacity was an important sub-theme of the exhibition 
installations. Under a heading entitled ‘Resilience’, an information panel celebrated the 
popular momentum which drove the recovery effort across the state in the first months of 
2011, reminding exhibition visitors of the 
resilience, generosity and community spirit that was shared during and after the floods, in 
the acts of kindness and lines of volunteers that filled our streets and farming 
communities (Floodlines 2012) 
 Many of the photographs documented the enormous volunteer effort that was focussed on 
flood affected suburbs in Brisbane and which allowed houses and streets to be cleared of 
flood damaged goods and debris within a very short time. These words and images reminded 
exhibition viewers that ordinary people within the community had together, done something 
extraordinary, and exhibited enormous good will towards the flood-affected. 
In a small brochure available from the exhibition, ideas about how to build resilience to 
future flood events were also discussed. Here, initiatives aiming to build a sense of 
community were prominent. One project included small stickers that urged neighbourhood 
members, ‘Don’t wait for a flood to say g’day’. In sum, the message from the exhibition was 
clear. A strong grass-roots community response will help us to be more resilient both as we 
seek to live more disaster ready lives, we experience disaster, and we recover from that 
experience. 
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Entitlement  
Community organisations and individuals within informal community networks provided an 
enormous amount of assistance, practical and emotional to flood-affected residents in 
Fairfield in early 2011. Unknown volunteers filled the suburb as the flood waters receded, 
and so did more fortunate unflooded neighbours, work colleagues, members of school 
communities, church groups, and sporting associations.  In later periods many were the 
recipients of economic and practical assistance from non-government welfare groups, 
community centres operating close to the suburb, and organic groups who sprang up in 
response to observed needs of flood affected residents. One example was a local Flood 
Recovery Centre, which operated, as a voluntary service, out of the local state school in the 
area for 12 months. (State government funding was later awarded to make this a fully-funded 
community centre). Another was a Garden Recovery Service, begun by two women in the 
neighbourhood, one of them a flooded resident, who rallied volunteers together to help flood 
affected households rebuild their gardens. 
Often informants expressed surprise about the diverse sources of this support, and wondered 
that various groups of people coalesced and coordinated their efforts to provide them with 
particular forms of assistance. This prompted recipients to recognise their place within a 
range of community networks, even while they had not necessarily felt fully part of those 
networks prior in the flood. This evidence supports claims about  redundancy and the 
importance of overlapping reciprocal social networks. It also suggests that we may be 
unaware of how deeply we are integrated into those networks until they come to our 
assistance. 
Problems of reciprocity 
 This created problems for some.   For example, a number of  informants talked about the 
extent to which their pride was at stake when offers of assistance came to them through the 
local community. Rather than accepting that they were entitled to draw on that assistance, 
some  informants talked about the need to be seen to be coping before their peers [in a similar 
vein to informants described above]. This was particularly so in the early days of the flood-
clean up when everyone was living off adrenalin and our streets were full of volunteers. 
For their part, the providers of help in my community rejected outright the idea that they 
needed to be repaid for their efforts. In this regard, my informants who had worked to 
provide assistance said that it made them feel good to help and that was enough: ‘That 
they could do something in the community’ (‘Carol’, interview June, 2012). Others called 
this ‘a privilege’ (‘Megan’, interview November, 2012). 
Many of the recipients of local informal help felt overwhelmed by the idea that they were ‘in 
debt’ to their community. One informant argued she was so embarrassed by her inability to 
pay back the kindnesses shown to her that she was no longer able to talk to one particular 
person in the suburb and would avoid casual contact wherever possible (‘Judith’, interview 
November, 2011). 
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Within the disaster management literature there is very little discussion of the way recipients 
of community assistance understand and respond to that assistance. This research has, to date, 
tended to reinforce the idea that more sources of community assistance equate to more 
resilient communities. However, this equation fails to recognise the emotional strain felt by 
people who receive assistance from their community, but absorb that assistance as 
individuals. Even though they may be viewed by providers of this assistance as naturally part 
of a community upon whom they can make claims, recipients may rationalise that assistance 
in a more individualised sense, thinking about what they ‘owe’ the providers personally.   
Others found problems with  accessing assistance from a faith-based organisation, which they 
had not previously supported. Informant responses suggested that people felt more entitled to 
government money than charity money and more comfortable with government procedures 
verifying their entitlement than the more personalised but personally intrusive ‘charity’ 
organisation approach. 
Confusion about this form of response may arise forobservers who assume that we live in 
close webs of reciprocity. Images of community solidarity in the face of adversity helped 
promote the idea that the communities of Brisbane, flooded or unflooded, would face up to 
the challenges or disaster recovery together. Such messages seemed to hinge upon the 
Putnamesque principle of reciprocal obligation that informs analysis of community responses 
within the disaster management literature.Some even contend that reciprocal networks 
intensify as result of the disaster experience, and that this provides as an added momentum to 
the recovery effort (Ganapati, 2005). 
On the other hand, research conducted in Fairfield shows that disaster-related assistance 
frequently brought neighbours into contact for the first (and possibly last) time.  Given that 
there was no preceding relationship with that person and the helper may have acted on the  
basis of generalised norms of behaviour rather than neighbourly concern, the recipient was 
often left in a quandary in terms of how, and whether, to reciprocate.  
The boundaries of a suburb are porous and so community is fragile.  In addition to the routine 
mobility that is part of urban life, there were also added pressures on hard-won community 
that were caused by the flood and its aftermath.  Some informants spoke of families living in 
rental accommodation in their street, and with whom they had made important friendships, 
leaving overnight (it was described as ‘disappearing’) without a farewell or a forwarding 
address (‘Lara’, interview September, 2011). Others described the neighbourhood households 
that broke up as marriages succumbed to long-term dissension, and stress. These 
developments were lamented when they also resulted in the disappearance of neighbourhood 
friends. 
I have witnessed rivalries emerge, fuelled by envy between neighbours over who has 
insurance coverage and who does not, who should access government money and who 
should not, and who might be able to take advantage of government property buy-back 
schemes and who could not. I have also seen lifelong friendships evaporate as neighbours 
conflict with each other over the design and appearance of newly rebuilt homes. One 
informant told me tearfully she was ‘in mourning’ for her community. 
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Since 2011, many of community events have been staged to assist the residents of Fairfield in 
the flood aftermath.  While these events have generally been well-attended, there was a lack 
of demographic diversity at these events.  To a large extent they appeal to white, middle-
class, relatively affluent people; those with an established level of comfort, rudely disrupted 
by the disaster.  Notably absent have been the migrant groups, the unemployed or those with 
disabilities; perhaps hampered by mobility challenges, social isolation and ensuing lack of 
access to information networks. The Fairfield Flood Recovery Centre provided a range of 
important supports for the elderly in our community.  Lacking the types of networks that 
develop as a result of involvement in school communities or that evolve through work, this 
group was potentially at great risk. 
For other groups within the population, however, this has not been the case.  The predicament 
of Farifield’s Somalian and Ethiopian populations has not been the focus of similar attention, 
even though many were living in highly precarious economic circumstances at the time of the 
flood and were also made homeless by the event.  There have been some notable and 
important efforts made by individuals to support these families, particularly those whose 
circumstances became known through the local state school networks.  But in general terms, 
this population of ‘renters’ rather than home-owners has been largely displaced to other parts 
of a city as a result of disaster. This scenario suggests that ethnicity and marginal economic 
status can function as barriers to inclusion in the community relief effort and can position 
people beyond the community networks which exhibit a sense of reciprocal obligation. 
Examining community based flood recovery from a gendered perspective also indicates the 
selective nature of ‘grass-roots’ disaster relief work.  In the earliest ‘clean-up’ stages of the 
event, the face of the volunteer effort was largely masculine.  The work was heavy, dirty, 
intensely fatiguing.  Men rose to the challenge and poured into the  suburb, many seeming to 
relish the chance to “get their hands dirty”; some so zealous that their ‘enthusiasm’ needed 
careful management.  If these men had children it seemed ‘natural’ that female partners 
remained at home with them, so that they would be safe from what we were told was the 
toxic flood aftermath.  Often those women helped out in ways that were more ‘feminised’.  
Sorting and washing mud sodden clothes, bedding or kitchen settings, cooking food to keep 
the manual labourers going. The gendered divisions of ‘mud and friendship’ seemed quite 
clearly established in these early days.   
As time has passed, the gendered face of recovery has become more profoundly marked with 
women seemingly more comfortable about contributing to this effort than men.  As needs 
have become more complex, and problems more difficult to solve, psychological strains in 
the community have become more evident.  In this environment, women volunteers seem to 
have come to the fore, frequently looking to create opportunities for people to talk through 
their experiences.  But these opportunities are also taken up, more usually, by women than 
men.  This also raises questions about where, how and if, men have been willing or had the 
opportunity to access this psychological assistance into the long term.  
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Literature examining the gendered impacts of disaster indicates that it is quite typical for 
ongoing flood recovery work to assume a ‘feminine face’ particularly when the ‘heavy 
lifting’ stage of the recovery effort has passed.  This work also suggests that it is commonly 
women who drive innovation in this area, building new organisations catering to observed 
social needs that go unmet (Yonder et al 2005, Enarson et al 2007).  These claims are  
supported by observations of women’s innovative responses to community need in Fairfield,  
and their ongoing willingness to reach out to vulnerable groups who have struggled to cope in 
the post-disaster context.  But this effort has also had a price.  One of the women who led the 
community recovery effort in Fairfield informed us that she experienced some difficulty in 
making her commitments outside the home understood by her primary-school age child who 
tended to resent these as an imposition on family life. 
Even though these women did important work in the suburb, they could not reach all those in 
need.  Certainly they rapidly identified the retired and elderly members of our suburb as 
potentially at risk and developed services which specifically assisted these groups.  But r 
vulnerable groups such as Fairfield’s migrant and refugee populations and the long term 
unemployed or disabled were harder to include.  These gaps in community participation have 
also been noted in other studies of community response to disaster and indicate that 
importance of understanding how other social markers of inequality can create “lines that 
divide” (Enarson and Fordham 2001) or barriers to social inclusion that undermine the 
participatory nature of community disaster response (Peek and Stough 2010, Enarson et al 
2007).  The experience of disaster is patched onto a community canvas that is already 
coloured.  Disaster itself does not necessarily mean communities will become more inclusive.  
While the limitations, exclusions and gendered pathways of engagement within the disaster-
affected community under study are worth noting they should not be viewed as a failure.  It 
would be unrealistic to imagine that an ideal community exhibiting a fully exclusive sense of 
reciprocal obligation would suddenly reveal itself in the post-disaster context.   
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North Booval 
Central to the idea of community resilience is the local neighbourhood and the strength of 
local leadership, social ties, collective action and civic participation in helping residents 
prepare for, and recover from, disasters. Yet despite the attention afforded to the 
neighbourhood in these debates, there is a relative silence on the role of neighbours in 
community resilience, apart from general advice that residents should ‘know their 
neighbours’ so they can turn to them during emergencies. Drawing on qualitative data on 
residents’ experiences of the 2011 floods this section examines the roles that neighbours 
played in the low-income suburb of North Booval in assisting one another prepare for, and 
recover from the flood.  Findings show that existing relations with neighbours – both good 
and bad – influenced the nature and extent of support provided by neighbours during the 
flood, and that neighbours in general provided low levels of assistance compared with  
family, volunteers and community organisations. Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the 
flood risk, neighbours appeared aware of certain responsibilities to warn one another of the 
impending flood, even when relations were poor or absent.    
Source:  Courier Mail  (2011) 
In Ipswich, where there was little warning of the severity of the impending disaster, North 
Booval was one of the most badly affected suburbs, not only in terms of the extent of the 
damage, but also its effect on residential instability and the housing market as residents were 
slow to return (Solomons, 2011). Table 1 shows the extent to which tenure in North Booval 
changed between census dates, which included the flood. 
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Table 1. Residential Tenure for North Booval, Ipswich and Brisbane, 2006-2011 (ABS, 2012) 
 
 North Booval (%) Ipswich LGA (%) Brisbane LGA (%) 
 2006 2011 Change  2006 2011 Change  2006 2011 Change  
Owned outright 32.38 23.33 -27.95 27.52 23.04 -16.28 30.20 27.72 -8.2 
         
Owned with a mortgage(b) 35.77 29.14 -18.54 38.76 37.43 -3.43 32.65 33.77 3.4 
          
Rented:          
      Real estate agent 15.18 26.67  16.25 22.91  18.69 21.12  
      State or territory housing 
authority 1.22 1.73 
 4.60 4.03  3.81 3.89  
      Person not in same household 9.21 9.88  6.78 6.48  9.03 8.38  
      Housing co-operative/community 
/church group 0.68 1.36  0.6 0.64  0.51 0.58  
      Other landlord type(d) 0.81 3.21  1.72 2.20  1.18 1.17  
      Landlord type not stated 0 0.99  0.67 0.53  0.67 0.51  
      Total 27.1 43.83 61.73 30.63 36.84 20.27 33.89 35.65 5.19 
         
Other tenure type(e) 0.4 0.37  0.36 0.43  0.75 0.76  
         
Tenure type not stated 4.34 3.33  2.74 2.25  2.52 2.10  
         
Total 100 100  100 100  100 100  
 
 
Neighbours remain a salient feature of suburban life since their physical proximity renders 
them an important source of local support (Unger and Wandersman, 1985), including during 
disasters where they can act as unofficial warning systems (Kim and Kang, 2009; Nagarajan 
et al., 2012) and be the first responders once the emergency has passed (Smith and Dowel, 
2000). Among disaster researchers and policymakers, there is explicit recognition of the 
importance of neighbourly ties in building resilient communities (Breton, 2001; 
Kirschenbaum, 2004).  
 As previous research demonstrates, neighbours remain a salient feature of suburban life 
since their physical proximity renders them an important source of local support (Unger and 
Wandersman, 1985), including during disasters where they can act as unofficial warning 
systems (Kim and Kang, 2009; Nagarajan et al., 2012) and be the first responders once the 
emergency has passed (Smith and Dowel, 2000). Among disaster researchers and 
policymakers, there is explicit recognition of the importance of neighbourly ties in building 
resilient communities (Breton, 2001; Kirschenbaum, 2004). 
Placing neighbours under the spotlight enables us to circumvent debate over the existence or 
absence of community in urban neighbourhoods and to say something more meaningful 
about the likelihood of neighbours being available as a form of support even where 
traditional conceptions of community are found to be absent.   
Our findings suggest that while these patterns indicate different levels of neighbourly support 
reported by participants, the severity of the event was such that it also generated a more 
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‘situated or occasioned’ form of neighbouring (Laurier et al., 2002: 353) where certain rules 
and moral obligations among neighbours were enacted even where usual neighbourly 
interactions were minimal. 
In a UK study on neighbouring Crow et al (2002) observed that, rather than there being some 
prevailing moral order of neighbourliness to which residents are compelled to conform, 
patterns of neighbouring were ‘actively constructed and chosen’ by individuals. This was 
evident among participants. While some appeared far more neighbourly than others, there 
was no obvious set of local norms in various neighbourhoods that determined levels of 
neighbourliness and neither did good relations with one set of neighbours necessarily 
transcend into a neighbourly place. Instead, participants appeared far more selective in 
determining which of their neighbours they became friendly with, based on various criteria 
such as similar stage of life-cycle, a sense of commonality; shared interests in other activities 
such as a Church. 
Low income suburbs like Booval tend to group people together on the basis of cheap house 
prices and rent and perhaps little else.  There was a high degree of suspicion toward 
neighbours and a desire to stay out of each other’s lives.    
This sentiment translated into a relatively low level of local community support during and 
after the flood.  There are practical as well as ethical reasons for this more muted level of 
neighbourly support.  The first is that such a high number of households were flooded that 
there was little capacity to provide assistance beyond one’s own household and the second is 
that the high number of renters in Booval meant that once tenants had secured their own 
property, there was little incentive to return to a landlord’s house or linger in the 
neighbourhood once alternative accommodation had been found.   
When we asked participants who had been their greatest source of support both during and 
after the flood. All but two said family and friends.  One participant, who had lived in the 
same house in North Booval for 28 years indicated that it was ‘friends and neighbours’ who 
had assisted him the most, however assistance tended to be from those neighbours who had 
also been residents for many years, rather as an outcome of any generalised norm of 
neighbourliness.  
Basic obligations of neighbourliness were performed. Times when it is acceptable to 
approach neighbours and disaster would be one of them. Also, while participants received 
advice from friends and family, in many cases they also checked with neighbours because – 
as neighbours – they were potentially in the same situation and those who had lived there a 
long time also had local knowledge, including of the 1974 flood. Once participant, for 
example, explained that his neighbour knocked on his door because he had lived there a long 
time.  
Obligations of neighbourliness seemed to play out even when relations were poor.  Nagarajan 
et al (2012) suggest that the decision of which neighbours to warn can  vary due to prior 
contact/hostilities with neighbours’ yet it appears in this case that the risk of flood was 
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significant enough that people were willing to warn those who they did not like, even if they 
did not go out of their way to do so.  
 
Also there were particular types of neighbours that they were most likely to forewarn, even if 
they did not interact with others. Official material encourages residents to look out for those 
who are vulnerable – the elderly, the disabled, those with young children, and several 
participants reported how they made an effort to alert a neighbour who they knew might be 
particularly vulnerable. 
In most cases, assistance with cleaning homes and sorting through the wreckage did not come 
from neighbours, principally because – as one participant explained – in many cases ‘they 
were all just so busy with their own houses’. However, there were some instances of 
neighbours helping taking it in turns to clean one another’s homes, or assisting neighbours 
while their own homes remained flooded. In most cases, however, this occurred among 
neighbours who were already very close. Another participant spoke extensively about his 
neighbour who had not only warned him about the flood but also gone looking for him in the 
evacuation centre some days later to bring him back to his house so he could inspect the 
damage. He explained how he first assisted his neighbour with his own home while leaving 
his own place to a large cohort of volunteers he had never met before.  
Unlike Baumgartner’s findings (1988) there is generally no prevailing moral order to which 
residents must conform and that their willingness to engage with neighbours is entirely 
personal. Yet, we found evidence of such expectations emerging in the aftermath of the 
disaster when, in one street, neighbours made the collective decision to work as a team and to 
clean up each house in turn rather than work on their individual properties as was the case in 
most areas a long term resident for example, described how he and his neighbours divided 
into groups and each group tacked three houses in turn. This had implications for those 
residents who either chose to opt out of this team approach, or who were not present to 
participate. This was met with reproach for the couple who chose to go alone: 
There was a couple down the end here who chose to do their own thing. We were back up 
and functioning days before they were. Because they didn't really join in … we just said 
well bugger ya, do it yourself, which is not the right thing to do but they had a choice.  
Conclusion 
Sense of community is stronger and local social interaction increases in the aftermath of a 
disaster, even if only temporarily.  The underlying basis of a community development 
approach to recovery is through the ‘empowerment of individuals and communities to 
manage their own recovery’.  A number of participants reported that their relations with their 
neighbours had improved as a result of the flooding. During the clean up, in particular, they 
met neighbours who they had not previously known and with whom they will now chat or 
acknowledge with a greeting. For others, existing relations had been strengthened as a result 
of shared experience.  In a low income environment like North Booval the neighbour effect 
was short lived due to the challenges of the effect of the disaster and the high level of 
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residential mobility resulting from the flood. The challenge for resilience is how to harness 
this brief window. 
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  The State - Community Development Officers 
Introduction  
In Australia and internationally, responding to natural disasters is one of the great challenges 
of the new millennium. Community development has been embraced as one of the useful 
ways of preparing for, responding to and recovering from natural disasters, but the exact 
nature of this role is not yet well articulated. By examining a specific community 
development program designed in response to the 2010-2011 Queensland natural disasters, 
this research aims to better understand the role of community development workers and the 
tensions within this emerging body of work.  
This component of the QCSSI report takes as its focus the Community Development 
Engagement Initiative (CDEI) which was established to assist with the reconstruction and 
recovery of Queensland and examines the ‘roles, responsibilities and efficacy’ of the state 
funded community development officers (CDOs) in ‘building capacity for future resilience 
from subsequent disasters’. The research employed a mixture of document analysis, 
participant observation and interviews with a range of stakeholders including 19 of the 24 
community development officers. 
This section discusses the structural component of the CDEI by examining the roles and 
responsibilities of the CDOs. The tensions within community development work when it is 
practiced in and against the state lead us to challenge state interpretations and demands upon 
the practice of community development and the evidence regimes that define it.  
In response to the 2010-2011 weather events, the Community Recovery and Wellbeing 
Package ($35.82m) was announced in April 2011. The Package was jointly funded by the 
Australian Federal (75%) and Queensland State (25%) Governments through the Natural 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). Part of this package included $20m 
in targeted funding for a Community Development and Recovery package over two years 
until June 2013, to enable the ‘implementation of a community development approach to the 
reconstruction and recovery of Queensland’ (Department of Communities,2011). The 
Community Development and Recovery funding was split into two streams, with $9.37m 
assigned to a state-wide Community Recovery Flexible Fund, and $10.45m released for the 
Community Development Engagement Initiative (CDEI). The CDEI funded 24 community 
development officers (CDOs) across Queensland to work in disaster response (Department of 
Communities, 2011).  
This section reports on research focused on the work of community development officers 
(CDOs) employed as a response to such disasters within the state of Queensland, Australia. It 
explains the context of the research, and locates it within a body of literature. Following a 
discussion of the research methodology, we consider the three main findings through the lens 
of the ‘dilemmatic space’. We conclude by examining the implications of these findings and 
the need for what we have called ecological or organic practice. 
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In Australia, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, adopted by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in 2011, marks a policy shift from a reactive, command 
and control model of emergency management to one that promotes a pro-active, bottom-up 
approach to disaster preparedness and recovery (Goode et al, 2013). Importantly, the Strategy 
articulates the notion of shared responsibility by advocating that disaster resilience is, ‘not 
solely the domain of emergency management agencies; rather, it is a shared responsibility 
between governments, communities, businesses and individuals’ (COAG, 2011).  
A broad body of research and literature has also captured this shift towards community 
responses to disaster management and recovery, including analysis of: community capacity 
building (Kenny, 2005); community planning (Pearce, 2003); community participation 
(Chandrasekhar, 2012); community resilience (Nicholls, 2012; Norris et al, 2008; Shaw & 
Maythorne, 2013); and community development (Mulligan & Nadarajah, 2011). In this 
article we will focus upon community development responses in particular.  
For example, where disaster management has traditionally relied on strong centralised top-
down command and control structures and a concentration on logistics (Pandey & Okazaki, 
2005), community development responses begin with a commitment to community control 
(Kenny, 2005). What this  also suggests is that at the level of principle and broad strategy 
there has been strong agreement on the importance of community involvement (Coghlan, 
2004; Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006), at the level of praxis,   processes have been less clear and 
the results far more mixed (Kenny, 2005; Pandey & Okazaki, 2005).  
Method 
To examine the dilemmas facing newly funded state CDOs in building capacity for disaster 
resilience, this research employed a mixture of participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews. Participant observation occurred during four regional forums across Queensland. 
In addition to providing a space for introducing CDOs to our research project and recruiting 
participants, observation at these forums helped the researchers deepen their understandings 
of the CDEI and its employment of community development processes and thinking. Of the 
24 CDOs, 19 agreed to be interviewed. Interviews occurred at a time and place of 
convenience to the participants.  Interviews with CDOs occurred across seventeen different 
regions of Queensland. Nine stakeholders were also interviewed to provide a broader policy 
and practice context for the work. These stakeholders included line managers, state 
government representatives and professionals in the disaster management field. Documents 
from the Queensland State Government and from the Local Government Association of 
Queensland provided additional history and context. 
Findings 
The official language of the community development program included crucial terms such as 
‘recovery’, ‘resilience’, and ‘preparedness’. Our research indicated that for CDOs attempting 
to operationalise them, these words were often points of tension within everyday practice. 
CDOs were comfortable in an interview context to discuss their practice within a disaster 
preparedness, recovery, and resilience framework, as well as a community development 
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framework. However, they also revealed that words such as recovery and resilience were 
generally not used in everyday grassroots practice, or were re-interpreted when working 
within communities.  The language of ‘resilience’ incurred some scepticism, seen as empty 
rhetoric by community members and CDOs. 
Resilience is a buzzword amongst the agencies and the government and the 
workers and everyone else. It’s one of those words that people in the community 
either just blink at you or say ‘What are those words?’ We don’t use it. [CDO3] 
This created a tension for CDOs who were caught between being responsive to the 
accountability/audit culture of government and the longer-term relational and partnership 
needs of community work. This was articulated by one CDO as the difference between the 
longer-term processes of community work as opposed to quick service-delivery mode: 
…through the floods my experience is that I’ve always talked to other agencies about, 
‘You know what, you just can’t go out there and provide a service, you have to build a 
relationship; and that relationship means having some CD skills about how to build a 
relationship with communities and that’s when your work will start flowing for you once 
you start using that framework.’ [CDO11] 
Another finding in relation to language and discourse was that ‘preparedness’ was the most 
palatable word for most community members, and therefore easier to use for CDOs. CDOs 
reported how,  
Our focus has been much more on preparedness because being prepared gives you a way 
to help you recover. It gives you back some degree of power. We won’t be using 
resilience as a main focus because it doesn’t resonate with people but the ‘be prepared’ 
focus was okay. [CDO3] 
Thus we see an ambiguous role, with heavy accountabilities in a complex, sensitive and 
evolving context. In trying to understand what could assist the navigation of this practice 
space we therefore return to the community development literature and consider two crucial 
themes:  
1) a community development workers’ need for responsive, flexible, or what we have 
called an organic or ecological practice – in relation to language, politics and 
engagement; 
2) the need for a different approach to in-situ education and training of CDOs within 
government-led programs such as this.  
The time sensitive and political nature of the program, involving three levels of government, 
highly sensitive issues of death, grief, loss and distress, economic fallout, media attention and 
the need by politicians at all levels to be seen to be responding, all placed enormous pressure 
on CDOs to be seen to be acting, and to have highly visible aspects to their work. The 
program had extremely tight accountability mechanisms (with fortnightly reporting by each 
CDO to state government) and tools that placed emphasis upon quantity (e.g. CDOs 
mentioned reporting on number of meetings and the numbers of participants). This 
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experience accords with a global shift in development practice, where practice is being 
strongly driven by what is being called “the results agenda” (Eyben, 2013). There was little 
recognition of the invisible and slow nature of much of community work. This created a 
tension for CDOs who were caught between being responsive to the accountability/audit 
culture of government and the longer-term relational and partnership needs of community 
work.  
 
The issue of time was crucial, with the relational practices of community work seen as 
requiring more time than the program often allowed. While one CDO saw the time pressures 
imposed upon the role as a welcome guarantee of avoiding building dependency, for three of 
the CDOs there was explicit frustration about the two-year time limit of their role. This limit 
was perceived as a constraint in terms of their CD practice and for the communities they were 
placed in. 
 
CD is years, it’s lifetimes, it’s not, ‘here’s a bucket of money for two years’, it 
doesn’t make an ongoing, sustainable community; it makes a short-term fix. It’s 
been great, it’s been a benefit and we’ve been able to do a lot but in some ways 
it’s gone against those communities too because they haven’t had to sit back and 
think about it…two years isn’t long enough, two years isn’t anywhere near the 
time…[CDO5] 
The third dilemma reported on in our findings is that of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ interventions. In 
many ways the dilemma is illustrative of perception of community needs and assets, and the 
clear demarcation within government of ‘siloed’ approaches to intervention (for example, 
with one department responsible for fixing roads and another for ‘fixing’ people’s mental 
health). In contrast, CDOs employing a more holistic understanding of communities and their 
needs, engaged ‘on their terms’. However, they were then left with dilemmas when 
communities’ identified their needs in ways that the official community development 
program did not allow them to respond to.  
There are tensions between community perceptions of what a CDO should be doing and what 
a CDO states they are mandated to do within their role description. The issue of chain-saw 
use provides an illustration of this tension. As one CDO explained,  
Every community consultation led to chain-saw needs being the number one issue. 
Without a chain-saw ticket you cannot use a chain-saw. After a disaster everyone buys 
chainsaws and /or an axe. We need to encourage this – our role is to make it safe. 
[CDO1]  
Community members argued to the CDO that what they needed was help to get ‘tickets’ (that 
is, a formal qualification) enabling them to use their chain-saws in the aftermath of a disaster. 
Residents’ analysis was that the crucial issue after a cyclone or flood is clearing fallen trees  
so that they could go and check on neighbours and then start clearing debris to quickly 
‘normalise’ the surroundings. The CDO dilemma is created when the CDO hears such a 
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request but is not mandated within their job description or the program policy guidelines to 
support the residents in such an initiative. As the CDO explained, 
[The program management] had an issue with it because they don’t see it as disaster 
preparedness and argued that it fell outside the CDEI guidelines. They didn’t ever ring 
me; they didn’t ever confer with me to say what the hell has chainsaw tickets got to do 
with storm preparation. They just said it fell outside the CDEI guidelines. [CDO 1]  
The official program focus is on ‘soft’ or psycho-social recovery work. Our findings indicate 
that the CDOs are mandated to facilitate psycho-social recovery but local people’s 
understanding of recovery is often more focused on the ‘hard stuff’ of clearing and fixing 
roads and bridges or acquiring necessary infrastructure 
The ‘soft’ skills of community development were contrasted with the hard skills of physical 
infrastructure, hazard management and reconstruction. Community development was named 
as being “fluffy” and “woolly”. The dilemma became acute as community members lost 
patience and many CDOs gave accounts of residents getting angry. However, as flagged in 
our introduction, it is difficult for residents to understand the roles of the CDOs when 
community development itself is an ambiguous space (Kenny, 1996, 2007).  
Conclusion 
This section has sought to understand the implications for community development workers 
located in the emerging field of survivor development, through the experience of the 2011-
2012 Queensland flood recovery work. This research has shown the complex and often 
compromised space in which community development is being undertaken, and the way in 
which the results agenda, and the political imperative of a program is often over-riding 
community agendas and bottom up practices. Findings also indicate that community 
development practitioners, caught in this complex and compromised space struggled with the 
language and discourse of official disaster response (particularly ‘recovery’, ‘resilience’ and 
‘preparedness’). Our discussion  – recognising that the complexity and compromised space of 
much community development practice will not become easier as the results agenda becomes 
more politically attractive and institutionally embedded – considers the way that community 
development practitioners could re-conceptualise their practice accordingly. We argue for a 
conscious organic or ecological approach to community practice where the community 
worker is aware that they are in a ‘responsive dance’ – in relation to a holistic understanding 
of the shifting policy, political and program context (official roles and program 
goals/objectives, indicators) – while also being responsive to the community’s use of 
language and their understanding of the need at hand. This conscious organic or ecological 
approach enables a practitioner to hold ‘their own centre’ so to speak, as changes occur 
around them.  
Furthermore, we argue for a re-think of the kinds of learning spaces, training and support 
required of community development workers to be effective in such large-scale community 
development programs. Underpinning this paper is awareness that community development is 
not simply a set of skills and techniques, but an ongoing process of learning and engaging 
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with context. This requires reflexive processes to engage consciously with the emerging 
environment. For the state this means that there needs to be a whole new way of imagining 
learning, education and training of community workers in contexts such as disaster response.  
For CDOs, reflexive practice requires activating personal agency and engaging in 
supervision, peer learning, mentoring and ongoing learning and reflection. Reflexivity may 
also require the creation by CDOs themselves, of these supports where they do not currently 
exist.  Finally, for the broader field of disaster management this paper suggests some 
additional thinking is still required to understand the role of community in disaster response. 
Community development programs clearly have potential to enrich the field. However the 
location of community development programs directly within the state simply subjects these 
initiatives to state command and control structures and regimes of accountability.  Only by 
utilising a systemic understanding and a more organic approach to developmental work can 
the intended policy shift of genuine partnership with community be realised. 
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   Summary of Findings and Deliverables 
1.        The relative effectiveness, from a local perspective, of crisis assistance and 
interventions from government and non-government agencies in facilitating community 
resilience post disaster in urban and non-urban areas. 
Institutional assistance from both government and non-government organisations played a 
vital role in the short term and long term recovery process.   While this assistance was 
evident in all of our studies and was for the most part very welcome, it was not always well 
coordinated or targeted.   
In our rural case study in Theodore, it was particularly important that where possible, 
organisations had some form of prior relationship with the community.  Rural 
communities are bounded both geographically and socially and tend to be less receptive to 
‘outsiders’ than urban residents. Relationships within these communities are strong and 
involve a high degree of trust and should be utilised wherever possible.  For small 
communities, where endogenous assistance is not sufficient to deal with the level of support 
required, local leaders and liaisons should be identified early to communicate with 
community members.  
According to the Living in Queensland survey, few people in Queensland claimed crisis 
financial assistance from agencies such as the Department of Communities (2%), 
Queensland Health (1%), charitable organisations (such as Red Cross, Lifeline, or Micah 
Projects; ~3%) or other local organisations.  The majority of respondents who were affected 
by the disaster in 2011 did not claim relief from the Prime Ministers disaster relief fund 
(89%) 
Rural communities have particular needs - one of these is access to financial assistance, 
particularly for farmers (and other small businesses) whose financial losses are far greater 
than just their homes. 
Government programs can often over-emphasise economic recovery objectives over other 
types of psychological, emotional or social forms of recovery.  Disaster responses that 
originate from within the community make possible a more inclusive and socially sensitive 
form of engagement with disaster affected populations than state-based top-down programs. 
Many people, and particularly in urban settings, found it difficult accepting charity from 
strangers and from non-government organisations.  While the helper is acting on the basis 
of generalised norms of behaviour, the recipient is left in a quandary in terms of how, and 
whether, to reciprocate. Informant responses suggested that people felt more entitled to 
government money than charity money and more comfortable with government procedures 
verifying their entitlement than the more personalised but personally intrusive ‘charity’ 
organisation approach. In these cases there may be a role for government representatives to 
broker or mediate these forms of assistance.  
In rural and urban locations it was found that there was a significant reduction in material 
assistance and affective support once the initial cleanup was completed.  This was when 
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the long terms losses and recovery started for victims and it was in the 12 months following 
the actual disaster that longer term recovery strategies such psychological support, financial 
support and other less ‘emergency based’ services need to remain in site.   
The constraints in provision primarily related to established services at the time of the flood 
being able to ‘stretch’ their funding guidelines to enable them to provide immediate 
support to the community.  Government agencies should consider allowing more local 
autonomy in determining budget allocation decisions in the aftermath of a disaster. 
Many low income renters become quickly displaced as the result of floods.  This scenario 
suggests that ethnicity and marginal economic status can function as barriers to 
inclusion in the community relief effort and can position people beyond the community 
networks which exhibit a sense of reciprocal obligation. 
2.The level of cooperation between community organisations, residents and key government 
agencies in responding to disaster and building resilience for future disasters 
It was very important that organisations were coordinated and communicated their 
presence, their capabilities and their intentions to residents.   In rural Theodore it was evident 
that many of the agencies did not provide prior notice of their arrival, which would have 
helped in   able   better utilising these services immediately.  In the rural context, it was 
important to identify a group of competent and well known local people who job it was to 
coordinate activity, to prevent duplication and to identify idiosyncratic (often personality 
based) needs for residents.  
In both the rural and urban case studies, the sheer number of organisations and volunteers 
arriving at these locations created a problem of redundancy and waste of resources.  Such 
a large influx of people arriving amidst the chaos of residents trying to clean up their homes 
and businesses required significant coordination. Those respondents who did participate in 
the post disaster recovery effort (33% of respondents) did so as largely as unregistered 
volunteers in the ‘Mud Army’ (8%, versus 2% who were registered volunteers), a locally 
organised event to distribute volunteers across the Brisbane area as a response to the damage 
caused by flooding.  
Literature examining the gendered impacts of disaster indicate that it is quite typical for 
ongoing flood recovery work to assume a ‘feminine face’ particularly when the ‘heavy 
lifting’ stage of the recovery effort has passed. As time has passed inFairfield, the recovery 
has taken on a more gendered character with   women seemingly more comfortable about 
contributing to this effort than men. 
Sense of community is stronger and local social interaction increases in the aftermath of a disaster, 
even if only temporarily. In a low income environment like North Booval the neighbour effect 
was short lived due to the challenges of the effect of the disaster and the high level of 
residential mobility resulting from the flood. The challenge for the longer term resilience of 
such neighbourhoods is how to harness this brief window to take better advantage of this 
window of neighbourly behaviour, where residents are prompted to recognise their place 
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within a range of community networks, even while they had not necessarily felt fully part of 
those networks prior in the flood. 
3.Where and how community organisations can complement government responses to 
disaster recovery. 
It should not be assumed that local resources should ‘get out of the way’ once institutional 
actors arrive on the scene.  In many cases the ability to respond to local needs is best 
assessed by competent local people.  This was particularly the case in the Theodore case 
study. 
There needs to be a central hub for coordination of local relief efforts and for ongoing 
assessment of residents’ material and emotional needs.  This hub should be somewhere that 
local leaders are highly visible and where residents and relief workers are welcome to come 
and to linger and mix so that these objectives are met.  Theodore and Fairfield both had these 
facilities and were highly valued by residents.   
In Fairfield, the Flood Recovery Centre operated as a voluntary service, out of the local state 
school  for 12 months. (State government funding was later awarded to make this a fully-
funded community centre). Another was a Garden Recovery Service, begun by two women 
in the neighbourhood, one of them a flooded resident, who rallied volunteers together to help 
flood affected households rebuild their gardens. 
Notably absent from these recovery centres were migrant groups, the unemployed or those 
with disabilities; perhaps hampered by mobility challenges, social isolation and ensuing lack 
of access to information networks. The local volunteer flood recovery centre provided a 
range of important supports for the elderly in the community.  Lacking the types of networks 
that develop as a result of involvement in school communities or that evolve through work, 
this group was potentially at great risk. 
4.The role and influence of organic local leaders during the recovery phase of the disaster 
and how these leaders can be better supported to respond to future crises. 
When asked to indicate who the most effective community leaders were in their community 
post disaster, survey respondents overwhelmingly nominated leadership from local 
governments and other institutional actors such as council members and police.  While the 
leadership roles they took on meant they became more visible within the community, their 
success in these roles depended on the relationships they had formed previously. 
Regardless of who community leaders were, most respondents (83%) indicated that they 
saw this individual as a community leader prior to the disaster. Disaster itself does not 
necessarily mean communities will become more inclusive.  
In Theodore it was not  gender that seems to have been a defining feature of the leadership 
shown. Rather, characteristics that contributed to the leadership related to being known 
and trusted in the community, a track record of stepping up, and social and political 
connections. 
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In Theodore, the leadership was provided by a small group of local people brought together 
by the Local Government member (who had family ties to the area as far back as 1863) and 
consisted of a local doctor who had worked in the community for some 25 years, a Theodore 
District Health Council worker who was also a long term resident of the community. 
While some of these were people who were expected to take up a more prominent role 
because of their current paid or voluntary work, a number of others also stepped up. Some 
leaders were perhaps not prepared for the emotional, mental and physical strain such an 
intense role can involve during a crisis. 
5.The role and influence of state funded community development workers (CDOs) in building 
community capacity to respond to future disasters. 
The official CDO program focus is on ‘soft’ or psycho-social recovery work. Our findings 
indicate that the CDOs are mandated to facilitate psycho-social recovery but local people’s 
understanding of recovery is often more focused on the ‘hard stuff’ of clearing and fixing 
roads and bridges or acquiring necessary infrastructure ‘soft’ skills of community 
development were contrasted with the hard skills of physical infrastructure, hazard 
management and reconstruction. Community development was named as being “fluffy” and 
“woolly”, which could constrain the ways the CDOs could involve themselves. 
The language of ‘resilience’ incurred some scepticism, seen as empty rhetoric by 
community members and CDOs.  The CDO dilemma is created when the CDO hears  a 
request but is not mandated within their job description or the program policy guidelines to 
support the residents in such an initiative.  
CDOs were caught between being responsive to the accountability/audit culture of 
government and the longer-term relational and partnership needs of community work. The 
program had extremely tight accountability mechanisms (with fortnightly reporting by 
each CDO to state government) and tools that placed emphasis upon quantity (e.g. CDOs 
mentioned reporting on number of meetings and the numbers of participants).  
Our discussion recognising that the complexity and compromised space of much 
community development practice will not become easier as the results agenda becomes 
more politically attractive and institutionally embedded, considers the way that community 
development practitioners could re-conceptualise their practice accordingly. 
For CDOs, reflexive practice requires activating personal agency and engaging in 
supervision, peer learning, mentoring and ongoing learning and reflection. Reflexivity may 
also require the creation by CDOs themselves, of these supports where they do not 
currently exist. 
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